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IN DEFENSE OF A DOUBLE 
STANDARD IN THE RULES OF 
ETHICS: A CRITICAL 
REEVALUATION OF THE CHINESE 
WALL AND VICARIOUS 
DISQUALIFICATION• 
[T]he advocate is bound in honor, as well as duty, to 
disclose to the client at the time of the retainer, every 
circumstance of his own connection with the parties or 
prior relation to the controversy, which can or may in-
fiuence his determination in the selection of him for the 
office . ... No man can be supposed to be indifferent to 
the knowledge of facts, which work directly on his inter-
ests, or bear on the freedom of his choice of counsel. 1 
[I]t should be recognized that today many lawyers prac-
tice in firms, that many to some degree limit their prac-
tice to one field or another, and that many move from 
one association to another several times in their careers. 
If the concept of imputed disqualification were defined 
with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical cur-
tailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one 
practice setting to another and of the opportunity of cli-
ents to change counsel. 2 
The "Chinese wall," or reliance upon internal devices for pro-
tecting client confidences, as a defense against vicarious disqual-
ification of law firms presents a curious double standard. At pre-
sent, the defense is available only where a government attorney 
* I would like to thank Professor Richard Lempert, who encouraged me to delve into 
the archives of the Kutak Commission; Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Theodore 
Schneyer, and Monroe Freedman, who assisted in locating the materials; and Olavi 
Maru, librarian at the American Bar Foundation, who provided access to the materials 
and a quiet workspace. 
1. G. SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 45-46 (1854). 
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1983). 
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joins a private firm after leaving public service; where a private 
attorney moves from firm to firm, no Chinese wall defense to 
firm disqualification is available. The arbiters of the ethics of 
the legal profession, the bar and the courts, have recognized the 
defense to protect former government employees and their law 
firm employers from disqualification because of potential con-
flicts of interest.3 
Firms may enter into representation involving matters in 
which one of thel firm's current partners or associates partici-
pated as a public servant. In doing so, firms may protect against 
the violation of client confidences by building a Chinese wall. 
Where a private attorney changes firms and encounters a similar 
conflict of interest in successive representation, he and his firm 
must obtain the former client's consent to continue the repre-
sentation or risk disqualification.• Only recently have some 
courts suggested that a Chinese wall might provide an accept-
able defense to such disqualification-termed "vicarious" or 
"imputed" disqualification-of the firm. 11 A more receptive atti-
tude toward the Chinese wall for the private attorney raises 
questions about the process and justifications for changes in eth-
ical standards in the legal profession and leaves law firms unsure 
of the risks that they face in hiring new attorneys and in ac-
cepting new clients. 
Examination of the ethical standard for vicarious disqualifica-
tion of law firms,6 and the exception for the properly screened 
3. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977); see also ABA Comm. on 
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 342 (1975) [hereinafter Formal Opinion 
342), reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. 517 (1976); MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 
1.11 (1983). 
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.l0(d) (1983). 
5. See, e.g., E.Z. Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (rejecting 
the Chinese wall defense because .the wall was not properly in place); Schiessle v. Ste-
phens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that special institutional mechanisms 
must be in place to avoid even inadvertent sharing of confidences) (citing LaSalle Nat'l 
Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983)). The disqualification is vicarious 
because it affects the firm solely because of the association of the individual attorney. 
6. Each emendation of the legal profession's ethical standards has considered a vari-
ety of conflicts of interest in the attorney-client relationship. One common concern has 
been the attorney who faces a former client as an adversary in a civil matter related to 
the former representation. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code), 
originally adopted in 1969, only indirectly addressed such a conflict. See MODEL CoDE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980) (addressing confidentiality); id. Canon 9 
(discussing appearance of impropriety); id. DR 5-105 (warning against impairment of 
independent professional judgment); id. DR 9-101(B) (referring to former public em-
ployee); id. EC 4-5 (exhorting against use of information to the disadvantage of the cli-
ent); id. EC 4-6 (urging preservation of confidences after termination of employment); id. 
EC 9-3 (offering example of former public employee and matter of substantial responsi-
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employee,7 reveals the interdependence of the organized bar and 
the courts in formulating the code of ethical conduct for the pro-
fession. Although the standards that courts apply will vary,8 
those adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) generally 
serve as a guide. 9 Yet the bar and the courts have separate roles 
in defining and modifying the standards.10 
bility). The consequence or risk of such a conflict lies in potential disqualification for the 
individual attorney or the imputed or vicarious disqualification of the firm. 
7. The firm builds a Chinese wall to isolate an attorney who may contaminate its 
representation of a new client because of his former involvement with the client's adver-
sary. Today, most firms routinely have in place at least minimum screening devices, 
hardly analogous to the Great Wall of China, to prevent a number of potential conflicts. 
See Keane, Microcomputers Can Resolve Conflicts of Interest, Legal Times, June 10, 
1985, at 13, col. 1 (discussing the basic requirements for a computerized screening 
system). 
The conflict of interest at issue is inherent in successive, not concurrent, representa-
tion. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983); Temple, Subsequent 
Representation and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: An Evaluation of Rules 
1.9 and 1.10, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 161 (detailing the distinction); Note, The Chinese Wall 
Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980); Developments in 
the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1981) 
[hereinafter Developments in the Law) (explaining the distinction). Cf. Lowenthal, Suc-
cessive Representation by Criminal Lawyers, 93 YALE L.J. 1 (1983) (discussing subse-
quent representation in criminal matters); In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 
F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1984) (raising similar conflicts growing out of class actions), cert. de-
nied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985). 
Discussion here is limited to conflicts of interest of private attorneys in successive rep-
resentation in civil actions. 
8. See Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1975); see 
also O'Dea, The Lawyer-Client Relationship Reconsidered: Methods for Avoiding Con-
flicts of Interest, Malpractice Liability and Disqualification, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 
696-97 (1980) (footnotes omitted): 
[N]o general federal law governs the conduct of attorneys .... Some federal 
district courts have adopted the American Bar Association Code of Professional 
Responsibility (the Code or CPR) by local rule; others have relied upon their 
inherent power to control the conduct of lawyers appearing before them .... An 
additional factor complicating ethical decisions by attorneys is the numerous re-
visions the CPR has undergone over the years. Because of these changes, the 
version of the Code found authoritative by some courts may differ significantly 
in critical provisions from the Code adhered to by others. 
9. O'Dea, supra note 8, at 696-97; see also Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 994 
(1986) ("Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association Standards 
and the like, ... are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides." 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984))). 
10. In considering a motion to disqualify, the federal District Court for the Southern 
District of New York raised an important distinction between the role of the courts and 
the role served by a code of professional responsibility: 
While the CPR is a source by which the courts may be guided, it is not the final 
word on disqualification. Courts are not policemen of the legal profession; that is 
a matter for the disciplinary arm of the bar. Disqualification is granted to pro-
tect the integrity of the proceedings, not to monitor the ethics of attorneys' con-
duct. As the Second Circuit has noted, 
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In the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the Model 
Rules), the ABA adopted a straightforward, black letter rule on 
vicarious disqualification;11 the comment, however, left open 
possible exceptions.12 Thus, the standard for vicarious disqualifi-
cation is ambiguous. Law firms have challenged the disqualifica-
tion rule;13 numerous commentators have criticized it.14 Never-
theless, the relatively recent ratification of the Model Rules1r, 
and the ongoing state-by-state consideration of the rules suggest 
that abolition or even revision of the imputed disqualification 
rule is unlikely. 
The courts remain equivocal, suggesting the possibility of a 
new standard but remaining reluctant to adopt one. Rather than 
. . . The Code nevertheless will continue to provide guidance for the 
courts in determining whether a case would be tainted by the participa-
tion of an attorney or firm. 
USFL v. NFL, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1463 n.31 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Armstrong v. 
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981)). 
11. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983): 
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not know-
ingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which 
that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously rep-
resented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about 
whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 [Confidential-
ity of Information] and l.9(b) [matters substantially related) that is material to 
the matter. 
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not 
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially ad-
verse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless: 
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the 
formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and 
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has [confidential) information .. 
12. 
The Comment to Rule 1.10 indicates the firm intention of its draftsmen that a 
pragmatic approach is necessary to the question of vicarious disqualification. 
The comment also extends the analysis of Rule 1.10 to disqualified lawyers in 
law firms generally, not only former government attorneys .... The rigid formal-
ism underlying Canon 9's injunction against an "appearance of impropriety" is 
strongly rejected in favor of a new philosophy of pragmatism which balances the 
expectations of confidentiality of a former client against the importance of al-
lowing a client the representation of his choice and promoting the mobility of 
attorneys. 
Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418, 425 (D. Del. 1986). 
13. The courts have expressed distaste for the use of the motion to disqualify as a 
litigation tactic by the former client. See Dalrymple v. National Bank & Trust Co., 615 
F. Supp. 979, 985 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (admonishing the courts to "be sensitive to tactical 
considerations which may impel a party to seek disqualification of a particularly compe-
tent or formidable opponent"); see also infra note 154 and accompanying text. On the 
other hand, the courts appear to be similarly unsympathetic to the firm that appeals 
disqualification without having had any precautions in place. 
14. See LaSalle Nat'! Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 258 (7th Cir. 1983). 
15. See infra note 39. 
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adopting a single standard for an acceptable Chinese wall, some 
courts have taken a case-by-case approach.16 Most seem to be 
taking one of two approaches: exploring the acceptability of a 
further exception to imputed disqualification, or scrutinizing 
proposed minimum standar~s for the Chinese wall that will 
make the exception possible. 
This Note suggests that no change is warranted at the present 
time; courts should not adopt the Chinese wall defense to vicari-
ous disqualification of private firms. The Chinese wall should, 
however, continue to operate as an internal device for protection 
of confidentiality. As such, it encourages firms to avoid disquali-
fication by obtaining client consent to successive representation. 
Neither the historical record of the work of the Commission on 
the Evaluation of Professional Standards (the Kutak Commis-
sion),17 the empirical evidence currently available, nor the prag-
matic arguments offered by many commentators justify an ex-
ception to, or modification of, the standard of imputed 
disqualification. Part I examines the historical development of 
the rule of vicarious disqualification, explaining the underlying 
rationale for the rule, the position of those who favor the rule as 
adopted in the Model Rules, and how the rule evolved with an 
exception for attorneys leaving government service. Part II dis-
cusses the status of the Chinese wall as a defense to vicarious 
disqualification, reviewing recent challenges to the present rule. 
Finally, Part III assesses the prospects for, and wisdom of, a 
change in the standard given the position that the courts have 
taken, the process of change within the ABA, and the practical 
problems of providing adequate guarantees against such con-
flicts of interest. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF VICARIOUS DISQUALIFICATION 
The modern codes of professional responsibility for the legal 
profession originated in written codes of the nineteenth cen-
tury.18 Since the 1908 adoption of the Canons of Professional 
16. See infra notes 61-64 & 111-20 and accompanying text. Yet the courts have been 
remarkably consistent in suggesting criteria for a well-built wall. 
17. The ABA established the Kutak Commission, with Robert J. Kutak serving as 
chairman, to review the Code; the result was the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(the Model Rules). See infra note 39. 
18. The forerunners of the contemporary codes of legal ethics in the United States 
were Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment (1836), re-
printed in H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 338 (1955), and ALABAMA STATE BAR Ass'N, CooE 
OF ETHICS (1887, 1899), reprinted in H. DRINKER, supra, at 352. These first systematic 
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Ethics (the Canons), the ABA has regularly amended and re-
vised the written standards.19 The Model Rules followed only 
thirteen years after the adoption of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (the Code). One reasonable explanation for 
this shift was the changing nature of legal practice in the 
1970's. 2° Firms became larger and more specialized. 21 Discussion 
and revision of the standard regarding vicarious disqualification, 
in particular, reveal the profession's sensitivity to changing con-
ditions of practice. This Part examines the evolving vicarious 
disqualification standard as reflected in the formulation of the 
Model Rules. 
A. The Process of Change 
Since adoption of the Canons, the first national code of ethics, 
in 1908, the ABA has recognized changed perceptions of the eth-
ical responsibilities of the legal profession through amendment 
of the Canons and the adoption of the Code and Model Rules.22 
The process of revision involves extended discussion and negoti-
ation. 23 The formal mechanism incorporates modifications 
originating in opinions of the ABA and state bar associations, 
and in state-adopted standards. Judicial opinions also influence 
and modify the ethical standards. 2• 
formulations for the American legal profession became the model for the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics (the Canons), the first national code of professional responsibility, 
adopted in 1908. The original Canons consisted of 32 aspirational statements, with 15 
more added over the next 29 years. 
19. The ABA replaced the Canons with the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity to rectify important omissions from the Canons, to make practical sanctions for vio-
lations more feasible, and to edit and modernize the standards. See Preface to MODEL 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980). 
20. The ABA proceeded to revise and eventually adopt the Model Rules in place of 
the Code after the Kutak Commission, charged with the revision, "concluded that piece-
meal amendment of the Model Code would not sufficiently clarify the profession's ethical 
responsibilities in light of changed conditions." Meserve, Chairman's Introduction to 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983). 
21. See Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1355, 1366; see also Note, Un-
changing Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of 
Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1068 (1964). 
22. See supra notes 17-20. 
23. See Meserve, supra note 20. 
24. One commentator questions the need for formal rules where "civil and criminal 
law, the market, and the desire for good standing in one's community would remain," 
and points to the resourcefulness of the common law: "The Code, for example, said little 
useful about successive conflicts of interest, yet courts readily proceeded to define them 
and to fashion appropriate disqualification remedies." Gillers, What We Talked About 
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The principles of loyalty to the client and protection of client 
confidences underlie the ethical standards regarding conflicts of 
interest in successive representation and vicarious disqualifica-
tion.211 By imposing a threat of disqualification, the bar added an 
incentive to avoid the temptation or accidental risk of violating 
a client's confidences. The risk extended to the firm as well be-
cause of the presumption that lawyers associated together had 
access to shared confidences.26 The presumption shifted the bur-
den of proof from the law firm seeking disqualification to the 
firm facing disqualification. 27 
Concerns regarding confidentiality and conflict of interest 
have permeated every revision of the ethical standards of the 
legal profession. One of the earliest statements of professional 
ethics in America described the lawyer's obligation to inform his 
client of potential conflicts with former clients.28 The Canons, as 
originally drafted, warned against subsequent conflicting repre-
sentation, stressing the values of loyalty to the client and confi-
dentiality.29 A 1937 amendment to the Canons related the con-
flict to the protection of confidences. The obligation to protect 
confidentiality outlasts employment and might even require the 
lawyer to refrain from undertaking conflicting employment. 30 
The emphasis on confidentiality was at least partially related to 
When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 
243, 244 (1985) (footnote omitted). 
25. See Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 
909 (1980) (discussing the principles of loyalty and confidentiality, their place in the 
hierarchy of ethical values, and their impact on the lawyer's duty of candor to the court 
and fairness to others); see also Ernie Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-71 (2d 
Cir. 1973) (stressing the value of the client's right to speak freely to chosen counsel and 
the importance of avoiding even the appearance of impropriety). But see Silver Chrysler 
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975) (fulfilling the 
duty of absolute fidelity to the client's confidences does not require a blanket approach). 
26. Note, supra note 7, at 682. 
27. Id. 
28. G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 1, at 45-46. 
29. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908): "The obligation to represent the 
client with undivided fidelity snd not to divulge his secrets· or confidences forbids also 
the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely 
affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed." 
30. 
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts 
the lawyer's employment ... [and he should not] accept employment which in-
volves or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences ... to the disad-
vantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there 
are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue 
employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance of 
his full duty to his former or to his new client. 
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1952) (as amended Sept. 30, 1937). 
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the notion of loyalty to the client.31 Other rationales for confi-
dentiality have included protecting the integrity of the legal pro-
fession32 and encouraging clients to come forward with 
information. 88 
The Code adopted language similar to the original Canons, 
emphasizing the protection of confidentiality8 " while voicing 
concerns regarding the exercise of independent professional 
judgmentu and the appearance of impropriety.86 The Code, 
however, made no specific reference to representation of a for-
mer client. At the time the ABA discarded the Code and 
adopted the Model Rules, the ethical standards of the profession 
called for lawyers and firms to avoid the appearance of impro-
priety by refraining from successive representation of clients in 
substantially related matters. 37 The Code continues in force in 
most states as the review process for the new rules gradually 
gets underway. 88 States may choose to keep the familiar Code, 
reject particular sections of the Model Rules-amending or re-
taining their old standard-or adopt the new standard. 
The Model Rules39 bring together, and attempt to deal ex-
pressly with, the issues of conflict of interest in successive repre-
sentation, "0 imputed disqualification,"1 and the screening, or 
Chinese wall, defense. 42 A close look at the development of the 
31. Patterson, supra note 25, at 941. 
32. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982). 
33. Note, Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to For-
mer Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 921 (1955). 
34. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4, EC 4-5, EC 4-6 
(1980). 
35. Id. Canon 5, DR 5-105. 
36. Id. Canon 9. 
37. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
38. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text. 
39. In 1977, the ABA Board of Governors created the Kutak Commission to consider 
revisions in the Code. After a preliminary review, the Commission assumed the task of 
reformulating the Code. Armstrong, The Kutak Commission Report: Retrospect and 
Prospect, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 475, 486-89 (1982). The ABA House of Delegates adopted the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct on August 2, 1983, after "[s]ix years of debate and 
often heated controversy" that "ended on a comparatively harmonious note." 52 
U.S.L.W. 2077 (Aug. 9, 1983). 
40. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983): "A lawyer who has for-
merly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter ... represent another person 
in the same or a substantially related matter .... " 
41. Id. Rule 1.l0(b); see supra note 11. 
42. Id. Rule 1.ll(b): "A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or 
continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from 
participation .... " 
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final rules through the records of the Kutak Commission reveals 
a shift away from strict imputation of disqualification.43 
B. The Disqualification Package 
The Kutak Commission shared the concerns of earlier 
ethicists for confidentiality and loyalty to the client's interests. 44 
The Commission began its work with a flexible approach, focus-
ing on principles to guide the lawyer m a variety of 
circumstances. 411 
As the Commission articulated the standards relating to con-
flicts of interest involving a former client, members reiterated 
the value of loyalty to the client. Commission members also 
raised the competing interest involved in enabling the client to 
have "the fullest choice of legal counsel reasonably possible."46 
Furthermore, pragmatic concerns argued against a strict disqual-
ification rule, particularly for the government attorney.47 The 
government attorney, who had broad exposure to a variety of 
issues and clients in a highly specialized area, and often had ac-
cess to sensitive government information, faced severe limita-
tions on his ability to shift to and work productively in the pri-
vate sector. Consequently, a strict disqualification rule was a 
strong disincentive to government service. 48 
43. The Commission's four-year effort provided detailed records of the changes that 
were made as well as the rationale and the sources for those changes. Although not the 
most controversial matter to come before the Kutak Commission, vicarious disqualifica-
tion was a continuing concern. The records of the Commission, including files and bound 
journals, collected by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., reporter for the Commission, are on file at 
the American Bar Foundation in Chicago, Illinois. 
The Commission records are collected in bound volumes and vertical files, both ar-
ranged chronologically. The bound volumes are cited herein as published works of the 
Kutak Commission. Sections within those bound volumes are cited as articles. Materials 
from the vertical files are cited as unpublished works [hereinafter Commission Papers]. 
Copies of the Kutak Commission bound volume and vertical file materials cited in this 
Note are on file with the Journal of Law Reform. 
44. Kutak Comm'n, Preliminary Working Draft, at 29-33, 70, in FEB. 24-25, 1978 
JOURNAL. 
45. "The problems arising from these various situations cannot be resolved by a mul-
titude of rules. They can be dealt with only in ... terms of principles which the lawyer 
must apply in good faith to the particular situation." Id. at 29-30. 
46. Kutak Comm'n, First Precirculation Draft, Aug. 2, 1979, at 7.1-3, in JUNE 1979 
JOURNAL. 
47. The Commission believed that "the rule of disqualification should not unreasona-
bly hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after hav-
ing left a previous association." Id. 
48. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. 
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The Commission's efforts to reconcile these issues resulted in 
the development of Model Rules 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11. The formu-
lation of each of these rules reflects some ambivalence among 
the members of the Commission. That ambivalence is, in turn, 
evident in the Commission's deference to case law, its efforts to 
moderate each of the standards, and its attention to the consent 
provision in each standard. 
1. Conff,ict of interest: the "substantially related" stan-
dard- The Commission's first draft of Model Rule 1.9-"Con-
flict of Interest: Former Client" -established the general outline 
of the rule but differed markedly from the final version.49 A key 
omission was the established standard for the relationship be-
tween the subject matter of the former and the present repre-
sentation-that they be substantially related. 50 
Fundamental to the law of conflict of interest in successive 
representation and vicarious disqualification cases is the sub-
stantial relation test established in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. 
Warner Bros. Pictures.rn Although the court declined to inquire 
into the nature and extent of the actual representation, it found 
49. The first draft read: 
REPRESENTATION ADVERSE TO A FORMER CLIENT 
(a) A LAWYER WHO HAS REPRESENTED A CLIENT IN A MATTER 
SHALL NOT THEN REPRESENT ANOTHER PERSON IN THAT MAT-
TER IF THE POSITION OF THE LATTER PERSON IS ADVERSE TO 
THAT OF THE FORMER CLIENT IN ANY MATERIAL RESPECT. 
(d) UPON ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE, THE DISQUALIFICATION PRO-
VIDED IN SUBSECTION (a) MAY BE WAIVED BY THE FORMER CLI-
ENT .... 
Kutak Comm'n, Working Papers, Dec. 15, 1978, at 1-37, in OCT. 1978 JOURNAL. 
The discussion in this Note is limited to those changes related to the nature of the 
lawyer's conflict of interest. Additional sections of the first draft considered the arbitra-
tor and the judge; a discussion of these roles is beyond the scope of this Note. 
50. Memorandum re: Draft Rules of Professional Conduct dated 1/25/79 from 
Thomas Morgan to ABA Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards at 4, reprinted 
in Kutak Comm'n, FEB. 1979 JOURNAL (referring to draft rule 1.11 and citing T.C. Thea-
tre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), for its holding that 
the matters must be substantially related); ABA Section of Corp., Banking & Business 
Law, Comments of Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability on December 
1979 Draft, reprinted in Kutak Comm'n, FEB. 1979 JOURNAL (stating that, as drafted, the 
rule was less restrictive of lawyers than the then-existing rule prohibiting representation 
in matters substantially related). 
51. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The court stressed the lawyer's duty of abso-
lute loyalty to the clients' interests and the duty to maintain the confidences of a client, 
thus encouraging clients to make known all the facts related to their case. Id. at 268-69; 
see also Note, supra note 7, at 681; Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1318 
(describing the test as a prophylactic one). Another concern was the indirect violation of 
confidences-that the court's inquiry into the lawyer's knowledge not reveal the confi-
dences that are being protected. Note, supra note 7, at 682. 
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the matters to be substantially related where one could reasona-
bly conclude that in the former representation the attorney 
might have acquired information regarding the subject of the 
subsequent representation. 112 
The Second and the Seventh Circuits have provided the most 
detailed analyses of the substantial relationship standard. 113 
Other courts have applied the tests expounded by these two cir-
cuits and have, somewhat reluctantly, disqualified law firms. 11" 
Courts have taken two complementary approaches to the stan-
dard delineated by the Second Circuit.1111 The first test of sub-
stantial relation,66 which builds upon T.C. Theatre, requires that 
the relationship between the prior and present representation 
not only be patently clear, but also be identical or essentially the 
same.117 More recently, a federal district court held that a finding 
of substantial relation requires "virtual congruence" of issues.118 
The second approach asks whether an attorney is "at least po-
tentially in a position to use privileged information concerning 
the other side through prior representation" and whether the 
representation threatens to taint the trial.119 Although the Sec-
52. 113 F. Supp. at 269. Some courts have interpreted the substantial relationship 
test to require an irrebuttable presumption that the individual attorney has acquired 
privileged information and must be disqualified, assuming that a substantial relationship 
exists. E.g., Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Mo. 
1985). Other courts have found the presumption rebuttable. E.Z. Paintr Corp. v. Padco, 
Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417,418,420 
(7th Cir. 1983); Haagen-Dazs Co. v. Perche No! Gelato, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282, 286 (N.D. 
Cal. 1986). 
53. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text. 
54. See, e.g., Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng'r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 438 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 
1980); Haagen-Dazs, 639 F. Supp. at 285-86. But see Whatcott v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1032, 
1035 (10th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the imputation of knowledge to the firm in a second 
round of litigation aimed at disqualifying opposing counsel). For a related case, see 
Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985). 
55. Sorting out the positions remains a challenge because of the Supreme Court's 
rulings on interlocutory appeal. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1981), 
overruled Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 
1975), but the decision in Armstrong was vacated on the interlocutory appeal issues, 449 
U.S. 1106 (1981). See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
56. Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 756. The panel considered upon whom the standard 
was to be imposed, distinguishing those who were heavily involved in the first attorney-
client situation from those who "enter briefly on the periphery for a limited and specific 
purpose relating solely to legal questions." Id. 
57. Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978). 
58. USFL v. NFL, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The law firm had repre-
sented the USFL in a series of early, organizing inquiries. In the earlier representation, 
the firm had avoided a conflict of interest due to simultaneous representation-the firm 
also represented the NFL commissioner-by obtaining the consent of both parties. 
59. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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ond Circuit has subsequently reaffirmed this approach, it noted 
that the appearance of impropriety alone is an insufficient basis 
for disqualification.80 
The Seventh Circuit has outlined a three-step approach and 
has more consistently found a rebuttable presumption of im-
puted knowledge at every level of communication-client to at-
torney, attorney to former and to present firm-than have the 
other circuits. 81 The first step asks whether there is a substantial 
relationship between the prior and present representation.82 The 
court will then determine whether the presumption of shared 
confidences and the imputation of knowledge to other members 
of the prior firm have been rebutted. Finally, the court looks at 
the present representation; if the presumption of shared confi-
dences is not rebutted, disqualification would follow.83 Recent 
decisions not only make clear that the presumption may be re-
butted, but also endorse the concept of the Chinese wall as one 
way to rebut the presumption-with "objective and verifiable 
evidence presented to the trial court and ... made on a case-by-
case basis. "84 
The decisions-particularly the approach of the Second Cir-
cuit-may pose an alternative to the Chinese wall defense and, 
accordingly, a way for the courts to avoid the abrupt change in 
policy represented by the Chinese wall. Such an approach would 
emphasize the circumstances of the representation. Judicial in-
quiry into the efficacy of a particular Chinese wall, on the other 
hand, would emphasize and perhaps create incentives for protec-
tion of client confidences. 811 
Despite some new approaches to conflicts-of-interest analyses, 
the substantial relationship test has remained a basic element of 
the analysis. The Kutak Commission recognized the error in its 
60. Id. at 1247. District court panels in the Second Circuit have expanded upon this 
view. See USFL, 605 F. Supp. at 1465-68; Yaretsky v. Blum, 525 F. Supp. 24, 30 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
61. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle Nat'! Bank v. 
County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1983); Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium 
A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, 607 F.2d 186, 190-92 (7th Cir. 1979); Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 223-25 (7th Cir. 1978); see also Talley, To-
ward Chinese Walls: The Seventh Circuit Debates Rebuttable Presumptions in Vicari-
ous Disqualification Cases, 11 S. ILL. U.L.J. 59 (1986). 
62. The standard is not as strict as the one that the Second Circuit has imposed 
because it does not require either the virtual congruence of issues or the tainting of the 
trial. 
63. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 420. 
64. Id. at 421. 
65. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. 
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omission and, in its next draft, restored the substantial relation-
ship test. 66 
2. Confiict of interest: balancing interests and obtaining 
consent- The other changes that the Commission made in re-
drafting Model Rule 1.9 indicated a desire to balance the inter-
ests of attorneys and clients. The final rule assured that the cli-
ent would be well-informed about potential conflicts of interest; 
the attorney who informed his client and obtained consent 
would be able to enter into or continue a new representation. 
The Commission revised the draft rule entitled "Conflict of 
Interest: Former Client" to prohibit using, to the disadvantage 
of the former client, information that was acquired in the course 
of the previous representation.67 Subsequent changes in this pro-
vision balanced the interests of attorneys and clients. The Janu-
ary 1979 draft excluded from the prohibition information that 
has become the subject of general knowledge.68 The final rule 
shifted the scope of the protected information from that "ac-
quired in service to the client" to that "relating to the 
representation. "69 
Clause (a) of draft rule 1.9 contained a consent provision, per-
mitting an exception to disqualification where "the former client 
consents after consultation."70 The members of the Commission 
considered several standards for disclosure as a condition of con-
sent. The first-"adequate disclosure"71-was a distinct contrast 
to the "full disclosure" standard contained in a related provision 
of the Code. 72 Subsequently, the drafters cast the exception in 
66. Kutak Comm'n, Working Papers, Jan. 1979, at 1.11-1, in DEc. 1978 JOURNAL. 
The Commission clearly deferred to case law in writing this standard. The reporter 
noted that the Commission questioned whether the standard of Rule 1.l0(a) (final Rule 
1.9(a)) was "adequately restrictive," but found it sufficient that "the substantial relation-
ship test set forth in this Rule was a direct derivative of case pronouncements on the 
issue." Kutak Comm'n, OcT. 1980 JOURNAL 22. 
67. This prohibition had appeared in the first working paper. Compare Kutak 
Comm'n, Working Papers, Dec. 15, 1978, supra note 49, at 1-37 with Kutak Comm'n, 
Working Papers, Jan. 1979, supra note 66, at 1.11-1. 
68. This change, preserved in the final rule and reversing, in part, Canon 37, relaxed 
the absolute inviolability of the client's confidences. For a critique of the change, see 
Kaufman, A Critical First Look at the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 
1074, 1079 (1980). 
69. Compare Kutak Comm'n, Working Papers, Jan. 1979, supra note 66, at 1.11-1 
("information acquired in service to the client") with Kutak Comm'n, SEPT. 1980 Discus-
SION DRAM' 44 ("information gained in or relating to representation") and MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(b) (1983). 
70. MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1983). 
71. Kutak Comm'n, SEPT. 1980 DISCUSSION DRAFT 44. 
72. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-5 (1980). 
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terms of the client's consent "upon disclosure."73 The final mod-
ifications, changing "disclosure" to "consultation,"74 and without 
the modifiers "adequate" or "full," suggest greater flexibility for 
the lawyer. The comment to the rule also included the client's 
authority to waive disqualification.75 
3. Vicarious disqualification- In writing the Model Rules, 
the Commission was at first unsure about the appropriate stan-
dard for imputation of disqualification from the individual law-
yer to the firm where a conflict of interest in successive repre-
sentation exists. Although the concept of vicarious dis-
qualification was familiar in case law,76 it appeared neither in 
the 1908 Canons nor in any of the amendments.77 The Code, as 
adopted in 1969, provided in Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-105 for 
an imputation of disqualification "if the interests of another cli-
ent may impair the independent professional judgment of the 
lawyer."78 A 1974 amendment extended the imputation to "with-
drawal from employment under a Disciplinary Rule."79 
The first working paper of the Commission opposed automatic 
imputation of disqualification to the firm solely because of the 
disqualification of a lawyer who had a prior attorney-client rela-
tionship with an opposing party.80 The Commission expressed 
concern for the government attorney moving into private prac-
73. Kutak Comm'n, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, MAY 1981 Rule 1.9. 
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 and Terminology (1983) 
(defining "consultation" as "communication of information reasonably sufficient to per-
mit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question"). 
75. See id. Rule 1.9 comment (balancing the interests of the client). But see Gillers, 
supra note 24, at 245 (footnotes omitted): 
The lawyers who approved the Rules looked after their own. They have given us 
an astonishingly parochial, self-aggrandizing document, which favors lawyers 
over clients, other persons, and the administration of justice in almost every line, 
paragraph, and provision that permits significant choice. It is internally inconsis-
tent to the bar's benefit. 
76. See Note, supra note 33, at 919. 
77. The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances stated the concept 
succinctly in 1931: "The relations of partners in a law firm are so close that the firm, and 
all the members thereof, are barred from accepting any employment that any one mem-
ber of the firm is prohibited from taking." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and 
Grievances, Formal Op. 33 (1931), reprinted in 17 A.B.A. J. 469 (1931). 
78. AMERICAN BAR FOUND., ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 225, 
246-51 (1979) (discussing changes in DR 5-105). The rule encompassed withdrawal from 
employment where the interests of another client might impair professional judgment. 
79. MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D). Disciplinary Rule 5-
105(D) (1980) (as amended Mar. 1974) of the Code thus encompassed withdrawal be-
cause of the "appearance of impropriety," and, in particular, withdrawal from private 
employment where a lawyer had substantial responsibility as a public employee. Id. DR 
5-105(D), Canon 9, DR 9-101(B); see Note, Confiicts of Interest and the Former Govern-
ment Attorney, 65 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1045-46 (1977). 
80. Kutak Cornm'n, Preliminary Working Draft, supra note 44, at 31. 
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tice and stated, "The standard is a narrow one, which does not 
preclude disqualification in appropriate cases."81 
Commission members ultimately decided to prohibit "know-
ing" representation.82 The final rule more clearly distinguished 
the firm with which a lawyer subject to disqualification becomes 
associated-which "may not knowingly represent a person in the 
same or a substantially related matter" -from the firm he has 
left-which "is not prohibited" from thereafter representing a 
person unless the matter is substantially related or a lawyer re-
maining in the firm has confidential information.83 The rule sug-
gests, and the comment makes clear, that different standards 
In 1975, the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar proposed an 
absolute imputation of disqualification; the proposal encountered opposition almost im-
mediately. See infra note 99. Late in 1977, as the debate continued in the District of 
Columbia, the Kutak Commission initiated its work. 
81. Id. At least one commentator asked the Commission for greater clarity in this 
section and suggested that the standard proposed was a relaxation of current case law. 
Memorandum from Elizabeth Bartholet to the ABA Commission on the Evaluation of 
Professional Standards (Dec. 1, 1978), in Commission Papers, supra note 43. 
The second draft provided a nearly complete outline of the final rule, addressing con-
flicting representation by lawyers associated in a firm and lawyers who leave a firm, as 
well as their subsequent colleagues, but omitting reference to the former firm. Kutak 
Comm'n, First Precirculation Draft, supra note 46, at 7.1-1. The Commission expressed 
its discomfort with vicarious disqualification of lawyers moving between firms: 
When lawyers have been associated but then dissolve their association, how-
ever, the problem is more complicated. The fiction that the firm is the same as a 
single lawyer no longer has realistic application .... First, the client previously 
represented must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client 
is not compromised. Second, the rule of disqualification should not be so broadly 
cast as to preclude other persons from having the fullest choice of legal counsel 
reasonably possible. Third, the rule of disqualification should not unreasonably 
hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after 
having left a previous association. 
Id. at 7.1-2 to -3; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1983) 
(expressing further concern regarding curtailment of opportunity). The Commission later 
included the "lawyer remaining in the firm." Kutak Comm'n, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, 
MAY 1981. at 95. 
The drafted rule embodied a prohibition on representation that involved a "significant 
risk of disclosing confidences or making improper use of information," or "assuming sig-
nificant participation or responsibility for asserting a position adverse to a client for 
whom the lawyer had previously assumed significant participation or responsibility in 
the same or a substantially related matter." Kutak Comm'n, First Precirculation Draft, 
supra note 46, at 7.1-1. 
82. Proposed Final Draft as Revised Through June 30, 1982, in Commission Papers, 
supra note 43; see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (1983) (defin-
ing "knowingly" as "actual knowledge of the fact in question," but stipulating that 
"knowledge may be inferred from circumstances"). 
83. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10; cf. ABA Office of Policy Ad-
min., Results of 1983 Midyear Meeting on Amendments to the Proposed Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, in Commission Papers, supra note 43 (including in draft submit-
ted to ABA Rule l.l0(a) as adopted, and combining the rules on termination and associ-
ation with a new firm). 
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should be applied to the lawyer, the former firm, and the pres-
ent firm.84 
One way to avoid the imputation of disqualification is to per-
mit the screening of a lawyer who is subject to disqualification. 
Several commentators proposed the screening defense for pri-
vate firms,86 but the Commission never seriously considered the 
suggestion. An early draft suggested some support by listing 
" [ r] elevant factors in determining the likelihood of actual access 
to client confidences."86 The comment to Model Rule 1.10 only 
hints at the use of the Chinese wall as a remedy to avoid dis-
qualification where a conflict of interest exists.87 
4. The public servant exception- From the outset, the 
Commission intended to give special attention to the govern-
ment attorney.88 Shortly after beginning deliberations, members 
decided to reserve a separate section for issues related to con-
flicts of interest of the government attorney.89 The members rec-
ognized the public interest in protecting the confidences that a 
government attorney might hold. Accordingly, the Commission 
wished to avoid potential abuses of government power and, at 
the same time, to protect government confidences.90 The Com-
mission also wanted to avoid restrictions on a successful private 
career, following government employment, that would dissuade 
highly qualified candidates from public service.91 
84. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1983). 
85. Digest of Comments on Final Draft, comment number 50 (1982), in Commission 
Papers, supra note 43 (suggesting that the "Comment recognizes propriety of screening 
mechanisms and they should therefore be referred to in the Rule"); id. comment number 
77 (advocating a screening provision "particularly because of the large number of lawyers 
employed by corporate law departments"). 
86. Kutak Comm'n, First Precirculation Draft, supra note 46, at 7.1-5 (listing the 
lawyer's professional experience, the division of responsibility, and the organizational 
structure of the firm). 
87. Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to Frances W. Hamermesh (Nov. 18, 1985) 
(describing the reference to the Chinese wall in the comments to rule 1.10 as "elliptical") 
(copy on file with U. M1cH. J.L. REF.). 
88. Kutak Comm'n, Preliminary Working Draft, supra note 44, at 70. 
89. Originally, the term "persons," as used in Rule 1.9, for example, was to encom-
pass the government agency. Kutak Comm'n, Working Papers, Dec. 15, 1978, supra note 
49, at 1-37. The Commission reorganized its draft documents to pull together issues re-
lated to the government attorney. Memorandum from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to Admin-
istrative Law Section Ad Hoc Committee on Rule 1.11 (Apr. 21, 1983), in Commission 
Papers, supra note 43. 
90. "The risk exists that power or discretion vested in public authority might be used 
for the special benefit of a private client." Kutak Comm'n, Discussion Draft, Jan. 1980, 
at 41, in OcT. 1979 JOURNAL. 
91. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. CL 1977) (describing the 
risk that the former government attorney could take on the status of a "Typhoid 
Mary"); Formal Opinion 342, supra note 3, reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. 517 (1976); Cutler, 
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To balance the strong public policy favoring the removal of 
disincentives to government service92 and concerns about the 
misuse of government authority,93 the Commission adopted a vi-
carious disqualification rule with an exception for screening: 
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a 
lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection 
with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally 
and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless 
the appropriate government agency consents after con-
sultation. No lawyer in a firm with which that [former 
government] lawyer is associated may knowingly under-
take or continue representation in such a matter unless .. 
. the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participa-
tion in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee 
therefrom .... 
(b) ... A firm with which that lawyer is associated may 
undertake or continue representation in the matter only 
if the disqualified lawyer is screened .... 94 
Thus, the screening provision in the Model Rules is an exception 
created to ameliorate the harsh effects of imputed disqualifica-
tion for the attorney who leaves or enters96 government service. 
A 1975 opinion of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics 
and Grievances, which cautioned against imposing too strict a 
standard of disqualification on former government lawyers, was 
the source of the screening provision. 96 Again, the concerns were 
limitations on the individual's employment options and the 
availability of able lawyers for government service.97 In 1969, the 
ABA had adopted the Code with a narrow vicarious disqualifica-
New Rule Goes Too Far, 63 A.BA J. 725 (1977). But see Freedman, For a New Rule, 63 
A.BA J. 724 (1977). 
92. See Kesselhaut, 555 F.2d at 793. 
93. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.ll comment (1983). 
94. Id. Rule l.ll(a)-(b). 
95. Id. Rule l.ll(c). 
96. 
There are, however, weighty policy considerations in support of the view that a 
special disciplinary rule relating only to former government lawyers should not 
broadly limit the lawyer's employment after he leaves government service .... 
[T]he ability of government to recruit young professionals and competent law-
yers should not be interfered with by imposition of harsh restraints upon future 
practice nor should too great a sacrifice be demanded of the lawyers willing to 
enter government service .... 
Formal Opinion 342, supra note 3, reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. at 518 (footnotes omitted). 
97. Id. 
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tion standard in DR 5-105.98 There was no mention of a screen-
ing defense. A 1974 amendment to DR 5-105 extended the dis-
qualification, and a strong response to the implications of this 
amendment provided the impetus for ABA Formal Opinion 342, 
which acknowledged circumstances under which screening was 
desirable as a defense against disqualification.99 
From 1978 until completion of the final draft of the Model 
Rules, the Commission struggled with the issue of separate 
treatment for the government attorney.100 The September 1980 
draft introduced a specific screening provision. The expanded 
98. See ANNOTATEu...C.onE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 78, at 246-51 
(annotating DR 5-105). 
99. The opinion acknowledges two circumstances where screening would be 
necessary: 
[1] [W]e construe D.R. 5-105(D) to be inapplicable to other government lawyers 
associated with a particular government lawyer who is himself disqualified .... 
Although vicarious disqualification of a government department is not necessary 
or wise, the individual lawyer should be screened from any direct or indirect 
participation in the matter .... [2] So long as the individual [former govern-
ment] lawyer is held to be disqualified and is screened from any direct or indi-
rect participation in the matter, the problem of his switching sides is not present 
Formal Opinion 342, supra note 3, reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. at 521. 
The debate over vicarious disqualification had special interest for the District of Co-
lumbia Bar Association. As the result of an inquiry to, and an opinion from, its Legal 
Ethics Committee, the D.C. bar undertook consideration of the matter at great length. 
Memorandum for the Board of Governors from William H. Allen, Chairman, Legal Eth-
ics Committee, District of Columbia Bar (July 3, 1978), in Commission Papers, supra 
note 43. Compare Freedman, supra note 91 (arguing against the use of a screening-
waiver provision to cure disqualification) with Cutler, supra note 91 (supporting screen-
ing for the government attorney). 
In 1982, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals resolved the issue with its "Revolv-
ing Door" order stating that the imputation of disqualification would not apply if the 
lawyer, disqualified from a matter "in which he participated personally and substantially 
as a public officer or employee," is "screened from any form of participation in the mat-
ter or representation as the case may be, and from sharing in any fees resulting there-
from." ("Revolving Door"), 445 A.2d 615, 617 (D.C. 1982) (per curiam) (adopting a 
screening and notification provision, and rejecting a requirement of waiver and the sub-
mission of affidavits). 
See also Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807 (1977); Fordham, There 
Are Substantial Limitations on Representation of Clients in Litigation Which Are Not 
Obvious in the Code of Professional Responsibility, 33 Bus. LAW. 1193, 1194-95 (1978); 
Note, supra note 79, at 1045-46. 
The Kutak Commission recognized that the new section on the government lawyer 
"[has] roots ... in the District of Columbia Bar's proposal and expressions of concerns of 
the Justice Department related thereto .... [T]he Commission's rule ... must contem-
plate broad nat'l application to lawyers situated in state and local governments." Kutak 
Comm'n, Journal, Dec. 14-16, 1979, at 17, in DEc. 1979 JOURNAL. 
100. Kutak Comm'n, Preliminary Working Draft, supra note 44, at 70 (discussing 
the obligation to maintain confidences); Kutak Comm'n, Unofficial Precirculation Draft, 
at 77, in TENTATIVE DRAFT #3, SEPT. 1979 (penciled-in comment noting: "take out gov-
ernment-deal separately"). 
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comment to the provision indicated that the Commission's ma-
jor concern was not to create disincentives to government ser-
vice. 101 The historical development of the screening provision 
and the language of the rule, supported by the records of the 
Kutak Commission, demonstrate the intent to permit screening 
as an exception to vicarious disqualification exclusively for the 
government attorney.102 
II. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WALL 
Despite the rather strict provisions favoring vicarious disquali-
fication that existed in the ethical standards, the bar has con-
sistently exerted pressure for the Chinese wall defense. Judicial 
decisions suggest several ways in which courts have responded to 
this pressure against disqualification, short of ruling on the Chi-
nese wall itself. This Part focuses briefly on the efforts of the 
courts and then on the standards suggested for the Chinese wall 
defense. 
A. A Shifting Standard 
Courts have continued to apply the substantial relationship 
test and to examine presumptions of shared confidences in prior 
and present representations. In recent years, the courts have 
considered the appealability of motions for disqualification. 
1. Imputing shared confidences- In reviewing conflicts of 
interest related to successive representation, courts have found 
that the lawyer-client relationship creates a presumption-most 
often an irrebuttable presumption-of shared confidences.103 
The presumption exists to protect and encourage client confi-
dences. When a lawyer shifts to another firm that becomes in-
volved in the same matter, there is the risk of violating a client's 
confidences. Considering the implications of such mobility, 
101. "The provisions on screening ... and waiver ... are necessary to prevent the 
disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering pu\)lic ser-
vice." Kutak Comm'n, SEPT. 1980 D,scussION DRAFT 48. 
102. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.ll(a)(l), (b) (1983); Kes-
selhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
103. Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985); see also Peterson, 
Commentary, Rebuttable Presumptions and Intra-Firm Screening: The New Seventh 
Circuit Approach to Vicarious Disqualification of Litigation Counsel, 59 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 399 (1984). 
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courts have differed in their willingness to impute that shared 
confidence to the firm that he has left or to his new firm. 104 
Where they have presumed a sharing of confidences, courts have 
split on whether such a presumption is rebuttable.1011 Neverthe-
less, courts seem increasingly willing to find these presumptions 
rebuttable.106 
2. Interlocutory appeal- Although the Supreme Court has 
never considered, on the merits, a case on disqualification of 
counsel for conflict of interest, the Court has, in recent years, 
addressed the appealability of disqualification questions.107 In 
its most recent case, 108 the Court refused to find that the risk of 
delay, the vindication of an attorney's reputation, or the use of a 
disqualification motion to harass an attorney were sufficient jus-
tifications for interlocutory appeal.109 With the rejection of an 
interlocutory appeal for disqualification motions in civil actions, 
a clear or predictable standard for disqualification becomes more 
important. 
B. The Chinese Wall 
After a court acknowledges that the presumption of shared or 
imputed sharing of confidences is rebuttable, the attorney or 
firm defending against disqualification must demonstrate the ef-
104. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 comment (1983); see also 
Note, supra note 7, at 682. 
105. Note, supra note 7, at 682 & n.24; see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
106. See Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 418 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle Nat'! Bank 
v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1983); Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium 
A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, 607 F.2d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1979); Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1978); Silver Chrysler Plym-
outh, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Liebman, 
The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 996 (1979); Peterson, supra note 103; Talley, supra note 61; Note, Towards a 
More Balanced Balancing: A Chronological Approach to Attorney Disqualification for 
Prior Representation, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 219; Note, supra note 7. But see Hallmark 
Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc, 616 F. Supp. 516, 519 & n.l (W.D. Mo. 1985) 
(describing the presumption as "irrefutable"). 
107. See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985) (holding that 
orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases are not subject to immediate appeal); Flanagan 
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (granting of pretrial motion to disqualify counsel in 
a criminal prosecution is not immediately appealable); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 
433 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that there is no interlocutory appeal of a denial of a pretrial 
motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 
(1981); Note, Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller: The Final Decision on the Immediate 
Appealability of Interlocutory Orders Disqualifying Counsel, 1986 DET. C.L. REV. 613. 
108. Richardson-Merrell, 105 S. Ct. 2757. 
109. Id. at 2765-66. 
FALL 1986] Reevaluation of the Chinese Wall 265 
fective construction of a Chinese wall. Although several of the 
federal circuits have endorsed the concept of a Chinese wall, 110 
few have accepted a particular design. They appear reluctant to 
accept any wall as a sufficient guarantee against a conflict of in-
terest. At the same time, however, in cases involving former gov-
ernment attorneys, the courts have begun to evaluate the stan-
dards of construction for a proper Chinese wall. These cases, 
which have found or described a wall that is sufficient to isolate 
the contaminating former government attorney, suggest the es-
sential elements of any Chinese wall. 111 The primary considera-
tions are isolation of attorney-client communications-past and 
future, verbal and written-the firm's experience and organiza-
tional structure, the system of rewards within the firm, and the 
size of the firm. 112 
Court decisions have suggested that adequate protections 
would consider the size of the law firm, the area of specialization 
of the attorney, and the attorney's position in the firm. 113 
Screening measures focusing on the individual attorney would 
guarantee that the attorney (1) was excluded from participation 
in the action, (2) had no access to relevant files, (3) derived no 
remuneration from the funds gained in prosecuting the action, 
(4) was not allowed to view documents related to the litigation, 
and (5) was not permitted to listen in on others' discussions of 
the matter. 11 ' 
ll0. The Seventh Circuit, in particular, has affirmed the concept of the wall but has 
adopted a case-by-case approach to analysis of the conflict of interest and the remedy. 
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
lll. Note, supra note 7, at 712-15; see also Note, supra note 106, at 241. Standards 
may also be gleaned from opinions of the ABA and from federal statutes and regulations. 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982); 31 C.F.R. § 10.26 (1986) (Treasury); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 200.735-8 (1986) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 46 C.F.R. § 502.32 (1986) 
(Federal Maritime Commission). 
ll2. Considerations include: (1) discussions between firm members and the screened 
lawyer regarding the former representation that are relevant to the new matter, (2) usual 
patterns of communication within the firm, (3) the firm's competence in the area in-
volved without the screened attorney or before he joined the firm, (4) communication 
within the firm regarding potential conflicts, and (5) elimination of any pecuniary inter-
est of the screened attorney. Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 889, 31 
REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 552, 570-71 (1976), reprinted in ABA, Disciplinary Workshop, June 
9-ll, 1977, Boston, Mass. (Tab 5). Courts at all levels have considered the requirements 
for the Chinese wall. See Manning v. Fort Deposit Bank, 619 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1985), appeal dismissed, 798 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1986); Weglarz v. Bruck, 128 Ill. 
App. 3d 1, 5, 470 N.E.2d 21, 25 (1984); see also Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 442 
(2d Cir. 1980), vacated, 449 U.S. ll06 (1981). 
ll3. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 1982); 
see also Manning, 619 F. Supp. at 1329; Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 
1367. 
ll4. Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 442. 
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The Court of Claims considered the efficacy of screening mea-
sures and upheld screening practices in two cases as sufficient to 
defeat a motion for disqualification. 1111 In Sierra Vista Hospital 
v. United States, 116 the court acceded to protections against ac-
cess to files, prohibitions on consultation with the disqualified 
attorney, and physical separation from files, including eventual 
transfer of the case to a different office of the firm. 117 In Kes-
selhaut v. United States, 118 the court was not willing to disqual-
ify where the firm acted promptly, and the individual attorney 
refrained from offering advice or information, never looked at 
the files involved, and received a straight salary with no share of 
the profits.119 
Assessing the efficacy of the Chinese wall thus requires an 
evaluation of the firm's ability to isolate the individual attorney 
and to identify matters of potential conflict.120 To date, some 
courts have been willing to accept criteria such as those sug-
gested in Sierra Vista and Kesselhaut. These cases, however, 
have involved former government employees. The underlying 
policy is that the court will not disqualify the firm if visible and 
effective measures are in place to avert a conflict. 
Whether the courts would apply the same standards when a 
firm attempts to screen a private attorney, rather than a former 
government attorney, is uncertain. The Seventh Circuit has 
come the closest to approving such an application, suggesting 
that "the presumption of shared confidences could be rebutted 
by demonstrating that 'specific institutional mechanisms,' (e.g. 
'Chinese Walls,') had been implemented."121 Nevertheless, that 
court has not as yet upheld any institutional mechanisms that it 
has examined. The Chinese wall remains unavailable as a de-
fense to the private attorney. 
Ill. WITHSTANDING PRESSURE FOR A CHANGE IN THE STANDARD 
Conflict of interest in successive representation has tradition-
ally been an ethical concern of the legal profession, and the pro-
115. Sierra Vista Hosp. v. United States, 639 F.2d 749 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Kesselhaut v. 
United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
116. 639 F.2d 749. 
117. Id. at 751-52. 
118. 555 F.2d 791. 
119. Id. at 792-93. 
120. For an extensive discussion of the factors in each category and a suggested form 
for screening, see O'Dea, supra note 8. 
121. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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fession has accepted the imputation of disqualification to the 
firm where an individual attorney would be disqualified. Permit-
ting a Chinese wall defense on a motion for disqualification 
would mean abolishing or relaxing the imputation of disqualifi-
cation. As more firms put Chinese walls into place to protect cli-
ents and prevent conflicts of interest, such security devices 
should be increasingly effective in enabling firms to acquire con-
sent and avoid disqualification. The Chinese wall exists to pro-
tect the former client's confidences. When a party, in good faith, 
believes that protection is inadequate, he withholds consent; if 
necessary, he moves to disqualify his adversary's counsel. Per-
mitting his opponent to use the Chinese wall defense would im-
pair the client's or former client's right to consent-an impor-
tant element in the attorney-client relationship. 
At present, the Chinese wall is not an adequate defense to a 
formal motion to disqualify a firm. At least three factors justify 
denying the defense. First, the legal profession has not yet fully 
considered the implications-in terms of either ethical standards 
or litigation strategies-of permitting the Chinese wall defense. 
Second, no one has evaluated the efficacy of particular methods 
of isolation. Finally, neither lawyers nor academicians have de-
bated the pragmatic advantages of professional flexibility and 
mobility against the absolute protection due a client's confi-
dences. This Part analyzes the lack of progress in these dimen-
sions-consensus, empirical evidence, and policy-in explaining 
why no change in the standard is warranted at the present time. 
A. Lack of Fuil and Open Discussion 
While developing a vicarious disqualification rule, the legal 
profession has had little open discussion of the Chinese wall de-
fense to a motion for disqualification. Analysis of the drafting of 
the Model Rules demonstrates that the bar has not yet ade-
quately considered the implications of a relaxation of vicarious 
disqualification.122 The state-by-state consideration and adop-
tion of the rules provides some indication of support for the rule 
of vicarious disqualification but says nothing about support for 
the Chinese wall defense. 128 Lastly, no empirical evidence is 
122. See Kutak Comm'n, First Precirculation Draft, supra note 46, at 7.1-2 to -5, for 
a discussion of the dilemmas in dealing with vicarious disqualification. Much of this dis-
cussion was incorporated into the comment to Rule 1. 10. 
123. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text. 
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available to demonstrate the efficacy of a wall in the context of 
today's large law firms. 12• 
1. Failure to consider the private attorney- The Kutak 
Commission members understood the rationale for the vicarious 
disqualification rule and arguments for and against the Chinese 
wall defense. They limited their discussions to the desirability of 
an exception for the government attorney1211 and did not ex-
amine whether to permit the Chinese wall defense for the pri-
vate attorney. The implications of the defense for the private 
attorney differ significantly from those related to the govern-
ment attorney's use of the defense. 126 The fact that the Commis-
sion developed a limited Chinese wall defense for the former 
government attorney does not justify extension of the defense to 
the private attorney. More discussion is required before allowing 
the private attorney to take refuge in the defense. 
The record of the Kutak Commission from 1979 through 1983 
shows a gradual evolution from a strict to a somewhat more re-
laxed standard of vicarious disqualification. The Commission in-
corporated the imputation of disqualification into its draft, 
made separate provision for the imputation of disqualification to 
the former government attorney, and then recognized screening 
to soften the harsh effects of the rule. 127 The Commission's 
records, including responses to their drafts, reveal that pressure 
for relaxation of the standard came from those most concerned 
with the problems of the public servant, 128 not from a general 
124. See infra notes 139-49 and accompanying text. 
125. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text. 
126. In May 1980, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti "vigorously" opposed a 
sweeping vicarious disqualification rule. He stressed the government's need to attract 
experienced and well-qualified people for positions of responsibility as well as capable 
young attorneys: 
This movement into and out of government is not accidental. It is the result of 
a deliberate policy choice by the Congress and responsible Executive Branch of-
ficials-a policy choice reflected and affirmed in the determinations made by the 
Congress and the Executive Branch regarding the conflict of interest and ethical 
restrictions that should be imposed on persons who enter and leave government 
employment. Arriving at the appropriate ethical restrictions has required a care-
ful balancing of the need to protect the integrity of government processes and 
the competing need to preserve the government's ability to attract and utilize 
the services of highly qualified lawyers. 
Civiletti, Commencement Ceremony, Tulane Univ. School of Law (May 10, 1980), in 
Commission Papers, supra note 43; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 
1439-40. 
127. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
128. The Commission Papers, supra note 43, contain correspondence between the 
Commission-in particular its Chairman, Robert Kutak, and Recorder, Geoffrey C. Haz-
ard, Jr.-and members of the Administrative Law and the Public Utility Law Sections of 
the ABA, dated from June 22, 1982 through May 18, 1983. 
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clamoring of private attorneys. Those interested in the issue 
controlled the discussion; therefore, Commission members gave 
little consideration to applying the exception to the private 
attorney.129 
Commission members did not systematically review reasona-
ble exceptions to vicarious disqualification. Rather, they consid-
ered the narrow question of whether, for policy reasons, there 
should be this single exception. They did not discuss the suffi-
ciency of screening. 
2. State adoption of the Model Rules- The process of state 
adoption of the ABA Model Rules is a critical measure of the 
acceptability of any of its provisions. 130 Since the ABA adoption 
in 1983, over half of the states have assigned committees on eth-
ics the task of reviewing the rules and making recommendations 
for revision of state professional responsibility codes. A survey of 
the actions to date suggests that the states have found the rules 
on conflict of interest in successive representation, vicarious dis-
qualification, and the screening exception for the government 
employee palatable.131 Thus far, twenty states and the United 
States Claims Court132 have adopted the Model Rules. Although 
almost all have amended the rules, only New Jersey and New 
Hampshire have amended Rules 1.9, 1.10, or 1.11; New Hamp-
shire made minor changes. 133 New Jersey, the first state to adopt 
129. Responses to Discussion Draft of Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1980), 
comments of Andrew Kaufman (1-32) (suggesting a detailed screening rule without con-
sent), Thomas Morgan (1-43) (urging separate consideration for the private and govern-
ment attorneys), and Michael N. Sohn (1-60) and Fritz R. Kahn (1-30) (both endorsing 
the solution of Formal Opinion 342), in Commission Papers; supra note 43. But see 
Kutak Comm'n, Public Hearings, comments of Richard Levine, DEC. 1979 JoURNAL (sug-
gesting the same criteria should apply to disqualification of both private and government 
attorneys). 
130. The Supreme Court has endorsed the role of the states in determining, at least 
in criminal proceedings, the ethical standards that will govern. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 
S. Ct. 988, 1006 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
131. [l & 2 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) passim. 
132. The Claims Court was the first to adopt the Model Rules, [l Current Reports] 
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 240 (May 30, 1984); the 20 states are: New 
Jersey, id. at 334 (July 25, 1984); Arizona, id. at 445 (Oct. 3, 1984); Montana, id. at 855 
(July 10, 1985); Minnesota, id. at 882 (July 24, 1985); Missouri, id. at 924 (Aug. 21, 1985); 
Delaware, id. at 961 (Sept. 18, 1985); Washington, id. at 962 (Sept. 18, 1985); North 
Carolina, id. at 1026 (Oct. 30, 1985); Arkansas, id. at 1126 (Jan. 8, 1986); New Hamp-
shire, id. at 1142 (Jan. 22, 1986); Nevada, [2 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Con-
duct (ABA/BNA) 14 (Feb. 5, 1986); Maryland, id. at 142 (Apr. 30, 1986); New Mexico, 
id. at 245 (July 9, 1986); Florida, id. at 261 (July 23, 1986); Connecticut, id. at 261 (July 
23, 1986); Idaho, id. at 401 (Oct. 29, 1986); Indiana, id. at 494 (Jan. 7, 1987); Wyoming, 
id. at 510 (Jan. 21, 1987); Louisiana, [3 Current Reports) Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct 
(ABA/BNA) 13 (Feb. 4, 1987); and Mississippi, id. at 53 (Mar. 4, 1987). 
133. See [2 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 14 (Feb. 5, 
1986). 
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the Model Rules, strengthened the protection for clients and 
adopted more restrictive provisions in these three rules.13" 
At least sixteen other states have considered or are consider-
ing new codes of ethics. New York,1311 Oregon,138 and Illinois137 
rejected revision along the liries of the Model Rules, although 
Illinois did, and Oregon may, adopt some of the revisions of the 
Kutak Commission, including the provisions on conflict of inter-
est. At least one state is considering suggested amendments to 
Rule 1.11. 138 Although moving slowly, the states have accepted 
the concept of screening for the government employee but have 
not extended it to the private lawyer. 
Both state and national bar associations have considered a vi-
carious disqualification standard. No bar has sanctioned screen-
ing other than in the narrow context of the government em-
ployee. Ratification records of the Model Rules reveal little or 
no particular attention given to the use of internal protection 
devices-Chinese walls-as a defense against disqualification of 
the private attorney. 
B. Lack of Empirical Support 
Despite Formal Opinion 342 and experience under the Code, 
no objective evaluation of the effectiveness of the Chinese wall 
exists. Courts have relied on affidavits but have not seen evi-
dence of how well modern, computerized screening works in the 
large firm. 139 Most firms have established some mechanisms for 
screening clients and attorneys to avoid a variety of potential 
conflicts of interest. 140 Some would argue that current screening 
methods provide adequate safeguards; the legal profession need 
not fear such breaches of confidentiality.141 The many court de-
134. (1 Current Reports) Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 17 (Jan. 25, 
1984); id. at 334 (July 25, 1984). 
135. Id. at 1047 (Nov. 13, 1985). 
136. Id. at 1048 (Nov. 13, 1985). 
137. Id. at 881-82 (July 24, 1985). 
138. Utah, id. at 881 (July 24, 1985). 
139. See Note, supra note 79, at 1047: "Yet, the effectiveness of screening is ques-
tionable. For example, attorneys can ignore or circumvent the segregation of the disqual-
ified attorney from the firm's earnings and the prohibition on contacts with other attor-
neys." Cf. Note, supra note 7, at 705 (analyzing the Chinese wall in financial institutions 
and finding it secure). 
140. See Huffman, Conflicts, Disqualifications Cause Persistent Headaches, Legal 
Times, May 5, 1980, at 1, col. 1, reprinted in Commission Papers, supra note 43. In one 
survey, 98'';, of the 50 responding law firms had some screening procedures in place. 
141. Id. 
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cisions that find inadequacies in those walls, however, suggest 
that, at a minimum, the courts need more information about the 
security of such a wall before permitting a relaxation of the im-
putation of disqualification. 142 
Many questions relating to conflicts of interest in successive 
representation and vicarious disqualification remain unan-
swered. Most firms today have adopted screening procedures to 
prevent conflicts, and screening works to the extent that former 
clients do, in fact, waive the disqualification. Presumably, if con-
sent is denied, the attorney disqualifies himself. Unanswered 
questions for empirical observation and study include: What 
screening procedures are in place?143 What distinguishes those 
cases where consent is granted from those where consent is de-
nied ?144 Are existing differences related to the quality of the 
screening, the degree of the substantial relationship, or the role 
of the individual attorney? 1411 Where a conflict is not resolved by 
waiver or withdrawal, and a former client brings a motion for 
disqualification, did the screening process break down? To what 
extent is the motion for disqualification a strategic litigation 
decision?146 
Little information on the incentive effect of a Chinese wall de-
fense is available. Because one objective of the conflict of inter-
est rules is to protect the client's confidences, an effective stan-
dard must strengthen the firm's initial screening, encourage 
attorney or firm withdrawal for apparent conflicts, and assure 
disqualification where such confidences are threatened. The con-
sent or waiver provision in the rules, the ethical obligation to 
avoid conflicts of interest, and the desire to avoid disqualifica-
tion provide a strong incentive for a strict initial screening of 
any new client and for withdrawal where a conflict is identified. 
142. The Seventh Circuit has suggested that the court will move cautiously, 
"[r]ecognizing that this is an area in which the relevant information is singularly within 
the ken of the party defending against the motion to disqualify and in which the reputa-
tion of the bar as a whole is implicated." LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 
252, 259 (7th Cir. 1983). 
143. Important questions include when the firm started using computerized systems 
to prevent conflicts of interest and how extensively they are used. 
144. The argument for a strict rule of disqualification is strengthened if cases in 
which consent is withheld are actually those where confidences are more likely to be 
revealed. 
145. To understand the efficacy of screening, it is helpful to examine the weight ac-
corded informal communications and reliance by one firm on the goodwill of others, or 
the degree of cooperation that exists. 
146. These last two questions are related. Before a court can determine whether 
screening is valid, it must be able to recognize an actual breakdown or failure in 
screening. 
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Without the Chinese wall defense, this remains the best route to 
avoiding disqualification. 
The effect of the Chinese wall upon the use of the motion to 
disqualify poses a more difficult question. Acknowledging 
screening as a legitimate defense may discourage such a tactic 
and encourage effective screening. Disallowing the defense, on 
the other hand, may encourage attorneys to disqualify them-
selves where there is an apparent conflict, thus enhancing confi-
dentiality and reducing the potential for use of the motion to 
disqualify. Courts have favored the second approach, but no 
study has demonstrated its effect upon confidentiality. Simi-
larly, no one has examined the possible effects of other ap-
proaches that courts may use to avoid disqualification where 
they feel that the screening has been adequate yet the rule pro-
hibits the Chinese wall defense. 147 
Several of the arguments favoring the wall defense present 
empirical questions for which data is not currently available. 
One argument is that vicarious disqualification threatens the 
mobility of private attorneys in the same way that it threatened 
the mobility of the former government attorney. The two attor-
neys are similar in experience and ambition. Today, the private 
attorney has a specialized practice; he is as apt to desire a career 
change after significant experience with one firm as is the gov-
ernment attorney. No study has compared the experience of the 
two. Thus, important questions about mobility-such s.s 
whether firms consider potential conflicts in new or lateral hires, 
and whether the possibility of future motions to disqualify actu-
ally constrains attorneys-remain unanswered. 
Proponents' arguments focus on the lawyer in the big firm. 
After all, the big firms with large numbers of clients, particularly 
clients with multiple associations, and with large numbers of 
lawyers with many former clients, seem to invite inquiry.148 
Courts have been adamant in their refusal to acknowledge the 
possibility of effective screening in a small firm. 149 Is such a dis-
tinction between large and small firms warranted? Data on firm 
147. See supra text following note 64. 
148. Thus, major firms such as Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison and Kirk-
land & Ellis have been involved in disqualification litigation. See USFL v. NFL, 605 F. 
Supp. 1448 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison); Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.) (Kirkland & Ellis), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). 
149. See Yaretsky v. Blum, 525 F. Supp. 24, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Note, supra note 21, 
at 1068; Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1355. The size of the firm is one 
factor considered by virtually every court and commentator. See supra notes 112-18 and 
accompanying text. 
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size and screening practices would help courts to determine 
whether firm size should be one factor in an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of any particular wall and whether, and when, it 
should operate to preclude the defense. 
Despite the lack of empirical data, the judiciary may possess 
special expertise in legal ethics to compensate for any lack of 
data on the successful implementation of techniques to isolate 
an attorney. The question, however, is not simply one of exper-
tise in ethics, but whether judges have the requisite familiarity 
with large law firm practice to evaluate the efficacy and desira-
bility of the Chinese wall. 1110 A survey of the panels of three fed-
eral circuits reveals varied backgrounds but a decided lack of 
large law firm experience in the post-1965 era of expansion. m 
Few judges have had the opportunity to evaluate screening from 
the perspective of their own employment in a large firm. 
C. Practical and Policy Arguments 
In evaluating the policies underlying the Chinese wall defense, 
the bar and the courts must address pragmatic and ethical con-
siderations. Opponents of the Chinese wall defense emphasize 
the ethical concerns-protecting confidentiality and avoiding 
conflicts of interest. Thus, vicarious disqualification provides a 
strong disincentive to conflicts of interest; the Chinese wall is an 
important self-help, internal security device, not for use as a de-
fense against disqualification. 
Proponents of the Chinese wall suggest that the defense is not 
inconsistent with justifications for the ethical standards regard-
ing confidentiality. 162 If the lawyer's obligation is to protect the 
confidences of the client, disqualification on the mere presump-
tion of a violation of confidences is unnecessarily restrictive. In 
addition, many would suggest that even the presumption that an 
attorney has acquired confidential information by virtue of his 
150. Conversation with Professor Wade McCree, Jr., Ann Arbor, Mich. (Sept. 23, 
1985). 
151. The criterion for large firm experience was whether the judge had practiced in a 
firm of more than 40 lawyers for at least five years since 1960. In the three circuits 
studied, three judges in the D.C. Circuit, three in the Second Circuit, and one in the 
Seventh Circuit met the criterion (credentials are listed in 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY (1985)). The probability of a randomly selected three-judge panel including no 
judge with such experience ranged from .339 in the D.C. Circuit to .70 in the Seventh 
Circuit. Consultation with Daniel S. Hamermesh, Professor of Economics, Mich. State 
Univ., East Lansing, Mich. (Mar. 1, 1986). 
152. Note, supra note 7, at 715. 
274 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:1 
membership in the firm is rebuttable, particularly in this era of 
large firms. m The prevalence of arguments for the Chinese wall 
and persistent litigation suggest pressure to revise the standard. 
Proponents' arguments, however, lack support and retain more 
than a hint of self-interest. 
1. The realities of legal practice- Courts have demon-
strated a reluctance to disqualify, and a willingness to accept the 
Chinese wall concept, where they believe that the motion for 
disqualification is being used as a delaying tactic in litigation. uH 
Proposed standards for the Chinese wall suggest some sympathy 
for the realities of today's legal practice; although large firms 
suggest that any one lawyer may be far removed from another 
matter handled by the firm, the trend toward larger firms in-
creases the potential for conflicts of interest.155 Attorney mobil-
ity and misuse of the disqualification motion remain the strong-
est arguments supporting the Chinese wall defense.156 
Arguments in favor of the Chinese wall have stressed its prag-
matic virtues. Even the possibility of vicarious disqualification 
threatens many of the basic characteristics of large-scale legal 
practice.157 These characteristics include interfirm mobility, con-
sultation, farming out of corporate work, and specialization. 158 
153. Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1330, 1355. 
154. 
[T)he rule serves no worthwhile public interest if it becomes a mere tool ena-
bling a litigant to improve his prospects by depriving his opponent of competent 
counsel; and the rule should not be permitted to interfere needlessly with the 
right of litigants to obtain competent counsel of their choosing, particularly in 
specialized areas requiring special technical training and experience. 
Formal Opinion 342, supra note 3, reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. at 518-19 (footnotes omit-
ted); see also Kaufman, Conflict Problems: Introduction, 33 Bus. LAW. 1191 (1978); 
O'Dea, supra note 8, at 694. 
155. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text; see also USFL v. NFL, 605 
F. Supp. 1448, 1467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
156. Few courts have, as yet, handed down opinions under the new Model Rules. 
Some decisions, however, have considered the standard set forth in the Model Rules 
even where the state has not as yet adopted them. One Arizona opinion examined the 
problem of mobility as addressed in the comment to Rule 1.10, pointing to the expressed 
concern that the rules 
not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on 
new clients after having left a previous association. The comments also acknowl-
edge that if imputed disqualification "were defined with unqualified rigor" there 
would be a radical curtailment of the opportunity for lawyers to move from one 
practice setting to another . . . . 
Galleher v. Horton, 148 Ariz. 537, 547, 715 P.2d 1225, 1235 (Ct. App. 1985); see also 
Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1366. 
157. Huffman, supra note 140; see also Note, supra note 111, at 220-21, 232. 
158. 
One factor that will often be relevant in determining whether screening will 
significantly increase attorney mobility is the degree to which the attorney and 
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Furthermore, the increased use of the motion for disqualification 
as a tool in litigation threatens added delay and costs to an al-
ready overburdened legal system. 1119 
Preservation of the client's right to choice of counsel has been 
the other major argument put forward by proponents of the Chi-
nese wall as a defense to disqualification.160 The Seventh Circuit 
has referred to the delicate balance between "the sacrosanct pri-
vacy of the attorney-client relationship (and the professional in-
tegrity implicated by that relationship) and the prerogative of a 
party to proceed with counsel of its choice."161 The Second Cir-
cuit has also suggested that the client's right to choose counsel 
freely requires courts to impose a high standard of proof on the 
side seeking to disqualify opposing counsel. 162 Limiting the use 
of disqualification as a sanction for a conflict of interest viola-
tion preserves the client's right to his choice of attorney.163 
Critics of the Chinese wall have challenged the ability of law 
firms to regulate themselves.164 Allowing firms to build a wall 
may create a false sense of security for the public. First, as the 
wall becomes institutionalized, an adversary claiming a breach 
or potential breach of confidences will have more difficulty gath-
ering evidence to prove that the wall is ineffective. At present, 
the threshold test is proof that the matters at issue in the cur-
his potential firm engage in a specialized practice with a relatively restricted 
clientele .... It is one thing to bar an attorney who has developed such a spe-
cialty from opposing former clients in matters substantially related to ones in 
which he has represented them; this may reduce his marketability to some de-
gree, but it will not necessarily preclude his becoming affiliated with lawyers en-
gaged in a similar practice. It is quite another thing, however, to extend the 
attorney's disability to all attorneys in any firm he joins; such a rule may in-
crease the security of former clients, but it devastates the attorney's future em-
ployment prospects. In such situations, permitting Chinese wall rebuttal of the 
presumption of shared knowledge can save the attorney from becoming a profes-
sional pariah. 
Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1366. 
159. Greene, Everybody's Doing It-But Who Should Be? Standing to Make a Dis-
qualification Motion Based on an Attorney's Representation of a Client with Interests 
Adverse to Those of a Former Client, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 205, 229 (1983); O'Dea, 
supra note 8, at 693-94. 
160. Greene, supra note 159, at 206. 
161. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983). 
162. Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978). 
163. Commentators have stressed their concern about overriding this right where 
courts have disqualified an attorney or firm. See Note, Attorney Disqualification: The 
Case for an Irrebuttable Presumption Rebutted, 44 ALB. L. REV. 645, 647-48 (1980); 
Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Representation of Interest Adverse to That of 
Former Client, 55 B.U.L. REV. 61 (1975); Note, supra note 21, at 1067. 
164. Victor, Firms Facing More Ethical Challenges, Nat'! L.J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 
4. 
276 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:1 
rent and former representation are substantially related. 1611 
Where the presumption of imputed confidences is rebuttable, 
the burden will shift to the present firm to prove that they have 
constructed an effective wall or that confidences have not been 
violated. To refute such testimony is an imposing task for the 
party seeking disqualification. 
2. Other arguments- Most discussion of vicarious disquali-
fication has focused on the desirability of modifying or relaxing 
the strict rule. Some commentators have suggested that the easi-
est way to resolve the uncertainty regarding the standard is to 
maintain an absolute rule of disqualification, 166 excluding even 
the government employee exception. 167 Such an approach, they 
argue, is the best way to safeguard confidentiality, assuming that 
is the goal. Anything less poses the temptation of circumventing 
the rule and introduces an appearance of impropriety. 
But there are also risks in such an absolute standard. First, it 
encourages the tactical use of the motion to disqualify. Firms 
need screening systems168 and will implement them. The abso-
lute standard, however, provides no additional incentive for 
firms to try to build as secure a system as possible. Given the 
strength of sentiment favoring some discretion in vicarious dis-
qualification, courts should seek alternative theories for avoiding 
disqualification, such as the "taint to the trial" rule. 169 
CONCLUSION 
The spectre of large law firms, increased specialization, and 
mobility at the associate level suggest the need for protection 
165. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
166. Telephone interview with Prof. Monroe Freedman, Hofstra Univ. School of Law 
(Nov. 20, 1985) [hereinafter Freedman interview]. The proposed standards of the Ameri-
can Trial Lawyer's Association permit successive representation only with the client's 
knowing and voluntary consent. The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation, 
The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, Rule 1.2 (revised draft, May 1982). But see 
Comment, Disqualification of Counsel: Adverse Interests and Revolving Doors, 81 
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 215 (1981) (footnote omitted): "Chinese walls, therefore, should be 
permitted in adverse interest disqualifications not only because they prevent the sub-
stantive impropriety of misuse of confidential information, but also because their very 
preclusion lends to these situations a greater appearance of impropriety than they objec-
tively should entail." 
167. Professor Freedman argues that the government context provides a good exam-
ple of the risk of conflict. How unlikely is it that anyone currently serving on a govern-
ment commission, but soon to be out in the private sector, will reject his former col-
league's request for consent? Freedman interview, supra note 166. 
168. O'Dea, supra note 8, at 718. 
169. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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against conflicts of interest in successive representation. Firms 
are successfully utilizing computerized systems to screen for and 
avoid potential conflicts. That success has increased the confi-
dence of firms in their own systems to the point where they are 
eager to argue that such screening, or the well-constructed Chi-
nese wall, should be a defense against a motion for disqualifica-
tion. But the limited nature of discussions within the profession 
and the lack of evaluation of the effectiveness of Chinese walls 
caution against permitting private attorneys to use this potent 
defense against vicarious disqualification of firms. 
Proponents of the Chinese wall defense urge that the profes-
sional responsibility rules treat all attorneys alike-if there is an 
exception for some, then there should be an exception for all. 
Opponents say that the exception should not swallow the rule. 
Given the inadequacies of discussions in the profession to date, 
the lack of empirical evidence available to support either posi-
tion, and the courts' inability to resolve concerns regarding 
abuse in the use of the motion to disqualify, no justification ex-
ists at present for judicial acceptance of the Chinese wall as a 
defense to vicarious disqualification. The Model Rules may pro-
vide the framework for a rare case that will permit a court to 
evaluate the adequacy of a particular wall. Meanwhile, those 
who would make the case for the wall have much work to do. 
Those who oppose the Chinese wall defense must examine the 
implications of the defense for traditional standards of confiden-
tiality, consent in the attorney-client relationship, and conflict of 
interest. 
-Frances Witty Hamermesh 

